Windows File Deletion Using Sysinternals SDelete (SDelete rename suffixes)
Flags Windows file deletions targeting filenames ending in .AAA or .ZZZ consistent with SDelete-style artifact removal.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_delete
- Author
- Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-05-02
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows file deletions where the target filename ends with the common suffixes used by Sysinternals SDelete during overwrite/rename patterns (.AAA or .ZZZ). Attackers may use SDelete-like behavior to hinder recovery and reduce forensic artifacts, so filename-based telemetry can provide early stealth indicators. It relies on Windows file deletion events that include a TargetFilename field and matches only when the filename ends with the specified suffixes, excluding a specific Wireshark dictionary path.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9
- github.comhttps://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.4_83D62033-105A-4A02-8B75-DAB52D8D51EC.md
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows File Deletion Using Sysinternals SDelete (SDelete rename suffixes)
id: aaec83e8-6ef1-468b-b4c2-01b8ae26d7a2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows file deletions where the target filename ends with the common suffixes used by Sysinternals SDelete during overwrite/rename patterns (.AAA or .ZZZ). Attackers may use SDelete-like behavior to hinder recovery and reduce forensic artifacts, so filename-based telemetry can provide early stealth indicators. It relies on Windows file deletion events that include a TargetFilename field and matches only when the filename ends with the specified suffixes, excluding a specific Wireshark dictionary path.
references:
- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9
- https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.4_83D62033-105A-4A02-8B75-DAB52D8D51EC.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070.004
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_delete
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- .AAA
- .ZZZ
filter_wireshark:
TargetFilename|endswith: \Wireshark\radius\dictionary.alcatel-lucent.aaa
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 6ddab845-b1b8-49c2-bbf7-1a11967f64bc
type: derived