Windows File Deletion Using Sysinternals SDelete (SDelete rename suffixes)

Flags Windows file deletions targeting filenames ending in .AAA or .ZZZ consistent with SDelete-style artifact removal.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: file_delete
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-05-02
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1070.004File Deletion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows file deletions where the target filename ends with the common suffixes used by Sysinternals SDelete during overwrite/rename patterns (.AAA or .ZZZ). Attackers may use SDelete-like behavior to hinder recovery and reduce forensic artifacts, so filename-based telemetry can provide early stealth indicators. It relies on Windows file deletion events that include a TargetFilename field and matches only when the filename ends with the specified suffixes, excluding a specific Wireshark dictionary path.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1070.004 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Deletion of Explorer RunMRU Values

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Suspicious Prefetch Deletion for Anti-Forensics

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Suspicious Self-Deletion Batch Artifact by JadeProx TriBack Loader (via file_event)

Windows File Deletion Using Sysinternals SDelete (SDelete rename suffixes)

Pivot detection · T1070.004 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-file-deletion-using-sysinternals-sdelete-aaa-zzz-filename-suffixes-6ddab845

title: Windows File Deletion Using Sysinternals SDelete (SDelete rename suffixes)
id: aaec83e8-6ef1-468b-b4c2-01b8ae26d7a2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows file deletions where the target filename ends with the common suffixes used by Sysinternals SDelete during overwrite/rename patterns (.AAA or .ZZZ). Attackers may use SDelete-like behavior to hinder recovery and reduce forensic artifacts, so filename-based telemetry can provide early stealth indicators. It relies on Windows file deletion events that include a TargetFilename field and matches only when the filename ends with the specified suffixes, excluding a specific Wireshark dictionary path.
references:
  - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9
  - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.4_83D62033-105A-4A02-8B75-DAB52D8D51EC.md
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_delete
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - .AAA
      - .ZZZ
  filter_wireshark:
    TargetFilename|endswith: \Wireshark\radius\dictionary.alcatel-lucent.aaa
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate usage
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 6ddab845-b1b8-49c2-bbf7-1a11967f64bc
    type: derived

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