Windows Processes in Suspicious Directories Initiating Connections to File Sharing Domains

title: Windows Processes in Suspicious Directories Initiating Connections to File Sharing Domains
id: cd574b04-5749-43cf-97fb-a90f6cf279fe
related:
  - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
    type: obsolete
  - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
    type: similar
  - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
    type: similar
  - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
    type: similar
  - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
    type: similar
  - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
    type: similar
  - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
    type: similar
  - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
    type: similar
  - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
    type: similar
  - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
    type: similar
  - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
    type: similar
  - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
    type: similar
  - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags network connections where an executable located in commonly abused system/user temp and recycle directories initiates outbound communication to file sharing or paste hosting domains. Attackers often stage or drop binaries in temporary or hidden locations and then use public file hosting services to move data or retrieve payloads while blending into normal web traffic. The detection relies on Windows network connection telemetry with the process image path and destination hostname, specifically matching processes running from the listed suspicious paths and destinations that initiate to domains in the provided set.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
  - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
  - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
  - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
  - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_file_sharing_domains_susp_folders.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_paths:
    Image|contains:
      - :\$Recycle.bin
      - :\Perflogs\
      - :\Temp\
      - :\Users\Default\
      - :\Users\Public\
      - :\Windows\Fonts\
      - :\Windows\IME\
      - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\
      - :\Windows\Tasks\
      - :\Windows\Temp\
      - \AppData\Temp\
      - \config\systemprofile\
      - \Windows\addins\
  selection_domains:
    Initiated: "true"
    DestinationHostname|endswith:
      - .githubusercontent.com
      - 0x0.st
      - anonfiles.com
      - bashupload.com
      - cdn.discordapp.com
      - chunk.io
      - ddns.net
      - dl.dropboxusercontent.com
      - ghostbin.co
      - github.com
      - glitch.me
      - gofile.io
      - hastebin.com
      - mediafire.com
      - mega.co.nz
      - mega.nz
      - onrender.com
      - pages.dev
      - paste.ee
      - pastebin.com
      - pastebin.pl
      - pastetext.net
      - pixeldrain.com
      - privatlab.com
      - privatlab.net
      - send.exploit.in
      - sendspace.com
      - storage.googleapis.com
      - storjshare.io
      - supabase.co
      - temp.sh
      - transfer.sh
      - trycloudflare.com
      - ufile.io
      - w3spaces.com
      - workers.dev
      - x0.at
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1