Windows Process in Suspicious Folder Initiating Network Connections to File Sharing Domains
Alerts on outbound connections to file sharing domains from Windows executables running out of suspicious temp/recycle/task paths.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- network_connection
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2018-08-30
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows processes whose image path contains commonly abused directories and that initiate outbound network connections to a set of file sharing and hosting domains. Attackers frequently use these services to stage payloads, exfiltrate data, or host commands over seemingly benign infrastructure. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination host/initiated activity) and process image path observations to link suspicious execution location with outbound traffic.
Reporting behind it
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
- symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.comhttps://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
- cisa.govhttps://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
- github.comhttps://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_file_sharing_domains_susp_folders.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Process in Suspicious Folder Initiating Network Connections to File Sharing Domains
id: cd574b04-5749-43cf-97fb-a90f6cf279fe
related:
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type: obsolete
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type: similar
- id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows processes whose image path contains commonly abused directories and that initiate outbound network connections to a set of file sharing and hosting domains. Attackers frequently use these services to stage payloads, exfiltrate data, or host commands over seemingly benign infrastructure. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination host/initiated activity) and process image path observations to link suspicious execution location with outbound traffic.
references:
- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_file_sharing_domains_susp_folders.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_paths:
Image|contains:
- :\$Recycle.bin
- :\Perflogs\
- :\Temp\
- :\Users\Default\
- :\Users\Public\
- :\Windows\Fonts\
- :\Windows\IME\
- :\Windows\System32\Tasks\
- :\Windows\Tasks\
- :\Windows\Temp\
- \AppData\Temp\
- \config\systemprofile\
- \Windows\addins\
selection_domains:
Initiated: "true"
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- .githubusercontent.com
- 0x0.st
- anonfiles.com
- bashupload.com
- cdn.discordapp.com
- chunk.io
- ddns.net
- dl.dropboxusercontent.com
- ghostbin.co
- github.com
- glitch.me
- gofile.io
- hastebin.com
- mediafire.com
- mega.co.nz
- mega.nz
- onrender.com
- pages.dev
- paste.ee
- pastebin.com
- pastebin.pl
- pastetext.net
- pixeldrain.com
- privatlab.com
- privatlab.net
- send.exploit.in
- sendspace.com
- storage.googleapis.com
- storjshare.io
- supabase.co
- temp.sh
- transfer.sh
- trycloudflare.com
- ufile.io
- w3spaces.com
- workers.dev
- x0.at
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1