Windows Process in Suspicious Folder Initiating Network Connections to File Sharing Domains

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows processes whose image path contains commonly abused directories and that initiate outbound network connections to a set of file sharing and hosting domains. Attackers frequently use these services to stage payloads, exfiltrate data, or host commands over seemingly benign infrastructure. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination host/initiated activity) and process image path observations to link suspicious execution location with outbound traffic.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Velociraptor Agent Deployment via msiexec From Cloud Storage

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Suspicious File Download Via Bitsadmin Transfer

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Explorer WebDAV UNC Download Using At-Port Syntax

Windows Process in Suspicious Folder Initiating Network Connections to File Sharing Domains

Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-processes-in-suspicious-directories-initiating-connections-to-file-shari-e0f8ab85

title: Windows Process in Suspicious Folder Initiating Network Connections to File Sharing Domains
id: cd574b04-5749-43cf-97fb-a90f6cf279fe
related:
  - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
    type: obsolete
  - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
    type: similar
  - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
    type: similar
  - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
    type: similar
  - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
    type: similar
  - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
    type: similar
  - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
    type: similar
  - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
    type: similar
  - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
    type: similar
  - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
    type: similar
  - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
    type: similar
  - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
    type: similar
  - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows processes whose image path contains commonly abused directories and that initiate outbound network connections to a set of file sharing and hosting domains. Attackers frequently use these services to stage payloads, exfiltrate data, or host commands over seemingly benign infrastructure. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination host/initiated activity) and process image path observations to link suspicious execution location with outbound traffic.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
  - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
  - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
  - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
  - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_file_sharing_domains_susp_folders.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_paths:
    Image|contains:
      - :\$Recycle.bin
      - :\Perflogs\
      - :\Temp\
      - :\Users\Default\
      - :\Users\Public\
      - :\Windows\Fonts\
      - :\Windows\IME\
      - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\
      - :\Windows\Tasks\
      - :\Windows\Temp\
      - \AppData\Temp\
      - \config\systemprofile\
      - \Windows\addins\
  selection_domains:
    Initiated: "true"
    DestinationHostname|endswith:
      - .githubusercontent.com
      - 0x0.st
      - anonfiles.com
      - bashupload.com
      - cdn.discordapp.com
      - chunk.io
      - ddns.net
      - dl.dropboxusercontent.com
      - ghostbin.co
      - github.com
      - glitch.me
      - gofile.io
      - hastebin.com
      - mediafire.com
      - mega.co.nz
      - mega.nz
      - onrender.com
      - pages.dev
      - paste.ee
      - pastebin.com
      - pastebin.pl
      - pastetext.net
      - pixeldrain.com
      - privatlab.com
      - privatlab.net
      - send.exploit.in
      - sendspace.com
      - storage.googleapis.com
      - storjshare.io
      - supabase.co
      - temp.sh
      - transfer.sh
      - trycloudflare.com
      - ufile.io
      - w3spaces.com
      - workers.dev
      - x0.at
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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