Windows Service Control Manager Rundll32 Obfuscation via Command-Line Encoded PowerShell

Detects service creation where ImagePath invokes rundll32 (shell32) with command-chain tokens indicative of obfuscated PowerShell.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Service: system
Author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-10-09
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Service Control Manager event 7045 where the configured service ImagePath includes rundll32 shell32.dll invocation patterns with command-line markers consistent with obfuscated PowerShell. Attackers may use rundll32 to indirectly execute script content while hiding intent through combined command syntax. Telemetry relies on Windows System logs for EventID 7045 and matching substrings within the service ImagePath.

Reporting behind it

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PowerShell Encoded or Download-Cradle Command Line (via process_creation)

Obfuscated Encoded PowerShell Payload Deployed - PowerShell (via powershell)

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Windows Service Control Manager Rundll32 Obfuscation via Command-Line Encoded PowerShell

Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-service-control-manager-execution-of-rundll32-with-obfuscated-powershell-641a4bfb

title: Windows Service Control Manager Rundll32 Obfuscation via Command-Line Encoded PowerShell
id: cb75bb34-93ed-4e46-9824-117b36f4025f
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Service Control Manager event 7045 where the configured service ImagePath includes rundll32 shell32.dll invocation patterns with command-line markers consistent with obfuscated PowerShell. Attackers may use rundll32 to indirectly execute script content while hiding intent through combined command syntax. Telemetry relies on Windows System logs for EventID 7045 and matching substrings within the service ImagePath.
references:
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1027
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
    EventID: 7045
    ImagePath|contains|all:
      - "&&"
      - rundll32
      - shell32.dll
      - shellexec_rundll
    ImagePath|contains:
      - value
      - invoke
      - comspec
      - iex
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
    type: derived

Convert

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