Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
6,296 rules
Malicious Replication Privileges Accessed to Perform DCSync Attack (via security)
This rule detects use DCSync or SecretDump tool to exfiltrate Active Directory credentials.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityHigh101Premium2026-07-07Suspicious Executable Persistence in Startup Folder (via file_event)
This rule detects an executable being written into the user Startup folder, the persistence method used by the VVS Discord stealer to relaunch itself at logon. Placing a binary under Start Menu Programs Startup guarantees the stealer re-executes on every user sign-in.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventMedium282Premium2026-07-07Suspicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Encoded PowerShell via Gladinet Exploitation
This rule detects the IIS worker process w3wp.exe spawning PowerShell with an encoded command argument, a behavior observed during active exploitation of the Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox insecure cryptography vulnerability where ViewState deserialization leads to code execution. Attackers abuse the hardcoded machineKey to forge ViewState payloads that execute PowerShell from the web application context. This chain indicates web-facing remote code execution and should be treated as a likely server compromise.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh244Premium2026-07-06Suspicious cscript Execution of JavaScript Spawned by PowerShell
This rule detects powershell.exe spawning cscript.exe to run a JavaScript file, the ClickFix execution chain used by EddieStealer in which a pasted PowerShell command launches a downloaded .js loader. This parent-child relationship combined with script-host execution indicates fake-CAPTCHA social-engineering malware delivery.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh488Premium2026-07-06PSEXEC Custom Named Service Binary
PSEXEC executed with non default service binary name
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium249Premium2026-07-06Malicious PlugX DLL Side-Loading via iviewers OLE Object Viewer (via image_load)
This rule detects the legitimate iviewers.exe OLE COM Object Viewer loading a co-located iviewers.dll from a non standard directory such as ProgramData. Velvet Ant abused DLL search order hijacking against this signed Windows SDK utility to load a PlugX loader and payload. Legitimate use of this tool loads its DLL from the SDK installation directory only.
HuntRule TeamWindowsimage_loadHigh82Premium2026-07-06Suspicious Wireless Credential Extraction via netsh wlan show profile in Katz Stealer (via process_creation)
This rule detects netsh.exe enumerating stored wireless profiles through the wlan show profile command, the WiFi credential extraction behavior performed by Katz Stealer during system profiling. Adversaries leverage netsh to recover saved network keys in clear text, making detection useful for identifying credential collection, though administrative troubleshooting can produce the same telemetry.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium101Premium2026-07-06Suspicious SoftPerfect Network Scanner Execution (via process_creation)
This rule detects execution of the SoftPerfect Network Scanner, a discovery tool used by the Agrius group during MoneyBird operations to enumerate hosts and services on victim networks. While a legitimate administrative tool, its appearance on endpoints often precedes lateral movement and should be reviewed.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium315Premium2026-07-06Malicious Microsoft Defender Whole-Drive Exclusion via PowerShell
This rule detects PowerShell adding the entire system drive as a Microsoft Defender exclusion path, an aggressive defense-evasion action used by Cyber Stealer to blind antivirus across the whole host. Excluding C drive from scanning is almost never legitimate and effectively disables Defender file protection, making this a high-confidence evasion indicator.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh321Premium2026-07-06Suspicious Modification of dMSA Managed Account Link Attributes
This rule detects directory modifications to the msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink or msDS-DelegatedMSAState attributes of a delegated Managed Service Account. The BadSuccessor attack abuses these dMSA attributes to inherit privileges from a targeted account and escalate in Active Directory. Changes to these attributes outside sanctioned administration indicate an escalation attempt.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityHigh132Premium2026-07-06Possible CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Forced Authentication via Outbound SMB (via network_connection)
This rule detects a Windows host initiating an outbound SMB connection on TCP 445 to a non-private external address. CVE-2023-23397 abuses a Microsoft Outlook reminder property carrying a UNC path to coerce the host into leaking Net-NTLMv2 credentials to an attacker-controlled SMB server. Successful forced authentication lets adversaries relay or crack the hash so the residual leak of a domain credential must be triaged.
HuntRule TeamWindowsnetwork_connectionMedium91Premium2026-07-06Suspicious NTDS Database Access via Command Line (via process_creation)
This rule detects command lines referencing the ntds.dit Active Directory database, which was staged along with the SECURITY and SYSTEM registry hives for credential extraction in a ShadowPad intrusion. Access to ntds.dit outside of backup software is a strong credential theft indicator. Copying the directory database yields every domain account hash for offline cracking and forgery.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium82Premium2026-07-06Suspicious winhlp32 Network Connection Indicating RemcosRAT Injection
This rule detects winhlp32.exe establishing an external network connection, behavior the legacy help viewer never performs and used in the OnlyDcRatFans intrusion as the injection host for RemcosRAT command and control. An outbound connection from winhlp32 signals injected malicious code beaconing to an attacker server.
HuntRule TeamWindowsnetwork_connectionHigh153Premium2026-07-06Malicious macOS Credential Verification via dscl authonly
This rule detects use of dscl with the authonly flag to validate a captured password against the local directory service, a technique used by the AMOS stealer to confirm harvested credentials after phishing the user. Legitimate interactive use of dscl authonly is rare. This behavior indicates active credential access and verification on the host.
HuntRule TeamMacosprocess_creationHigh336Premium2026-07-06Malicious Kimsuky Keylogger PowerShell Functions PokDoc and InfoKey (via ps_script)
This rule detects PowerShell script content containing the PokDoc and InfoKey function names used by the Kimsuky implant observed against Japanese organizations. These function names are implant-specific keylogging and document-collection routines, so their presence in scriptblock logs indicates hands-on infostealer activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsps_scriptHigh153Premium2026-07-06