Platform SearchSigma to Carbon Black Cloud
Paste a Sigma rule, get a Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search query for investigated process telemetry. Free, no sign-up.
Worked examples on Carbon Black Cloud
Real published rules run through the same engine as the tool above — including the ones it cannot take whole.
Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utility id: 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a built-in utility being asked to base64-encode a file, which is a common way to stage data before moving it off a host. It exercises the `windash` modifier, where one flag has to be matched in both its dash and slash spellings. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that legitimately encode files level: medium license: DRL-1.1Carbon Black Cloud · Platform Search
device_os:WINDOWS AND ((process_name:*\\certutil.exe OR process_original_filename:CertUtil.exe) AND (process_cmdline_raw:*\-encode* OR process_cmdline_raw:*\/encode* OR process_cmdline_raw:*–encode* OR process_cmdline_raw:*—encode* OR process_cmdline_raw:*―encode*))Every condition converted cleanly to Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search. 2/2 conditions
PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Linewindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Line id: 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the download-and-run pattern where a remote payload is fetched and executed in one command. It exercises a value list under a single field, which every backend has to expand into its own OR form. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_fetch: CommandLine|contains: - '.DownloadString(' - '.DownloadFile(' - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: - '| IEX' - 'IEX (' - 'Invoke-Expression' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers and package managers that fetch and run their own payloads level: high license: DRL-1.1Carbon Black Cloud · Platform Search
device_os:WINDOWS AND ((process_cmdline_raw:*.DownloadString\(* OR process_cmdline_raw:*.DownloadFile\(* OR process_cmdline_raw:*Invoke\-WebRequest\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*Invoke\-RestMethod\ *) AND (process_cmdline_raw:*\|\ IEX* OR process_cmdline_raw:*IEX\ \(* OR process_cmdline_raw:*Invoke\-Expression*))Every condition converted cleanly to Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search. 2/2 conditions
Registry Import With A Suspicious Pathwindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Registry Import With A Suspicious Path id: 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a registry import whose argument does not look like an ordinary file path. It exercises a regular expression alongside a `not` filter, so the report has both a regex to check against the target's engine and a negated branch to place. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: '.reg' CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' filter_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -e ' - ' -a ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter_flags falsepositives: - Scripted registry maintenance level: high license: DRL-1.1Carbon Black Cloud · Platform Search
device_os:WINDOWS AND ((process_name:*\\regedit.exe OR process_original_filename:REGEDIT.EXE) AND process_cmdline_raw:*.reg* AND process_cmdline_raw:/.*:[^ \\].*/ AND (NOT (process_cmdline_raw:*\ \-e\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ \/e\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ –e\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ —e\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ ―e\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ \-a\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ \/a\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ –a\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ —a\ * OR process_cmdline_raw:*\ ―a\ *)))Every condition converted cleanly to Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search. 3/3 conditions
File Copy Through The Print Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: File Copy Through The Print Utility id: 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the print utility being used to copy an executable rather than to print. It exercises `startswith` together with `contains|all`, where several substrings must all appear in one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: '\print.exe' CommandLine|startswith: 'print' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/D' - '.exe' filter_self: CommandLine|contains: 'print.exe' condition: selection and not filter_self falsepositives: - Printing a file whose name ends in .exe level: medium license: DRL-1.1Carbon Black Cloud · Platform Search
device_os:WINDOWS AND (process_name:*\\print.exe AND process_cmdline_raw:print* AND process_cmdline_raw:*\/D* AND process_cmdline_raw:*.exe* AND (NOT process_cmdline_raw:*print.exe*))Every condition converted cleanly to Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search. 2/2 conditions
What to know about Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search
This target emits the Lucene query that Carbon Black Cloud's Processes Search API accepts in its query field, rather than a legacy Carbon Black EDR or CB Response search. They share a brand but not a schema: Platform Search names the process path process_name and the command line process_cmdline, while older products use different field families. Keeping that boundary explicit matters because a query that parses against the wrong product can still return no results and look perfectly healthy.
The first coverage slice is deliberately focused on Windows process creation. Every query starts with device_os:WINDOWS and uses the documented Process Search fields for process image, parent, PID, user, original filename and executable metadata. Command lines bind to the raw command-line fields, which preserve separators such as backslashes and parentheses; the ordinary tokenized field intentionally discards many of those characters while indexing.
Carbon Black Process Search supports negation, but its own documentation points out the consequence: NOT process_cmdline:value also includes records where the command line is missing. That is the same absence behaviour Sigma negation expects, so the converter does not add an existence guard that would silently narrow the rule. Fields whose values are not provably comparable — Sysmon process GUIDs, composite Hashes and Windows logon-session IDs — make this strict target refuse the conversion instead of emitting a plausible-looking mismatch. Validate the resulting query against your tenant before turning it into a watchlist or alert.
How it works
- Step 1
Paste the rule
Drop a Sigma rule into the left pane, or open a .yml file. The tool says what it thinks you pasted before anything is sent.
- Step 2
Pick your SIEM
Choose the target dialect. Every shipped target is free and none of them are behind a sign-up.
- Step 3
Read the report
The query comes back with the log-source profile that was used, every field it renamed, and anything the target could not express.
- Step 4
Verify, then deploy
Run it against your own telemetry in audit mode before it alerts on anything.
Questions
Paste the Sigma rule into the tool on this page and press Convert. It returns Platform Search for Carbon Black Cloud, the log-source profile it matched, the field map it applied, and anything Carbon Black Cloud cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search, specifically the Processes Search API and Investigate process-search surface. It does not emit the legacy Carbon Black EDR/Response query language or Live Query SQL, because those products use different schemas and query contracts.
The first verified coverage slice is Sigma Windows process creation. device_os:WINDOWS is the documented Platform Search population filter, so it prevents a process-name or command-line clause from searching a different operating system population.
This is a strict schema target. A Sysmon GUID, composite Hashes value or Windows logon-session ID is not automatically the same thing as a similarly named Carbon Black field. The converter stops with the field named rather than sending a query that runs and silently matches nothing.
It will run if your field names match the profile shown in the report. Whether it matches the right events depends on your own telemetry, so verify it before deploying. The coverage figure tells you how much of the rule made it into the query.
The other pair
The same tool, with a different target preselected.
- Sigma to SplunkSPLSearch Processing Language against a CIM-normalised index.
- Sigma to Microsoft SentinelKQLKusto over Sentinel's analytics tables.
- Sigma to Microsoft Defender XDRKQLKusto over the Defender advanced-hunting Device* schema.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityKQLKibana Query Language over ECS-mapped indices — the Kibana default.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityLuceneLucene query_string — required when the rule uses a regular expression.
- Sigma to CrowdStrike FalconCQLCrowdStrike Query Language for Falcon LogScale and Next-Gen SIEM.
Sigma to Google Security OperationsYARA-L 2.0UDM Search syntax for Google SecOps, scoped by its normalized event type.
Every rule in the detection catalog is written in Sigma, so any of them converts to Carbon Black Cloud here.