Sigma to Elastic Lucene
Paste a Sigma rule, get a Lucene query_string for Elastic Security — including the rules KQL cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
Worked examples on Elastic Security
Real published rules run through the same engine as the tool above — including the ones it cannot take whole.
Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utilitywindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utility id: 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a built-in utility being asked to base64-encode a file, which is a common way to stage data before moving it off a host. It exercises the `windash` modifier, where one flag has to be matched in both its dash and slash spellings. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that legitimately encode files level: medium license: DRL-1.1Elastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.executable:*\\certutil.exe OR process.pe.original_file_name:CertUtil.exe) AND (process.command_line:*\-encode* OR process.command_line:*\/encode* OR process.command_line:*–encode* OR process.command_line:*—encode* OR process.command_line:*―encode*))Converted to Elastic Security Lucene with 1 note. 2/2 conditions
PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Linewindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Line id: 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the download-and-run pattern where a remote payload is fetched and executed in one command. It exercises a value list under a single field, which every backend has to expand into its own OR form. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_fetch: CommandLine|contains: - '.DownloadString(' - '.DownloadFile(' - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: - '| IEX' - 'IEX (' - 'Invoke-Expression' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers and package managers that fetch and run their own payloads level: high license: DRL-1.1Elastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.command_line:*.DownloadString\(* OR process.command_line:*.DownloadFile\(* OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-WebRequest\ * OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-RestMethod\ *) AND (process.command_line:*\|\ IEX* OR process.command_line:*IEX\ \(* OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-Expression*))Converted to Elastic Security Lucene with 1 note. 2/2 conditions
Registry Import With A Suspicious Pathwindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: Registry Import With A Suspicious Path id: 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a registry import whose argument does not look like an ordinary file path. It exercises a regular expression alongside a `not` filter, so the report has both a regex to check against the target's engine and a negated branch to place. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: '.reg' CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' filter_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -e ' - ' -a ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter_flags falsepositives: - Scripted registry maintenance level: high license: DRL-1.1Elastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.executable:*\\regedit.exe OR process.pe.original_file_name:REGEDIT.EXE) AND process.command_line:*.reg* AND process.command_line:/.*:[^ \\].*/ AND (NOT (process.command_line:*\ \-e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \/e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ –e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ —e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ ―e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \-a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \/a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ –a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ —a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ ―a\ *)))Converted to Elastic Security Lucene with 1 note. 3/3 conditions
File Copy Through The Print Utilitywindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: File Copy Through The Print Utility id: 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the print utility being used to copy an executable rather than to print. It exercises `startswith` together with `contains|all`, where several substrings must all appear in one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: '\print.exe' CommandLine|startswith: 'print' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/D' - '.exe' filter_self: CommandLine|contains: 'print.exe' condition: selection and not filter_self falsepositives: - Printing a file whose name ends in .exe level: medium license: DRL-1.1Elastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND (process.executable:*\\print.exe AND process.command_line:print* AND process.command_line:*\/D* AND process.command_line:*.exe* AND (NOT process.command_line:*print.exe*))Converted to Elastic Security Lucene with 1 note. 2/2 conditions
What to know about Elastic Security Lucene
Lucene is the second query language Kibana accepts, and on this site it is not the alternative to KQL so much as the completion of it. KQL has no regular-expression operator; Lucene does. If your Sigma rule uses `|re`, this is the page that can answer it, and Elastic's own documentation points the same way.
Lucene's regular expressions are not PCRE and the differences bite immediately. A Lucene regexp is implicitly anchored to the whole field value, so a pattern that would match a substring elsewhere matches nothing here unless it is wrapped in `.*`. The shorthand classes are absent — no `\d`, `\w`, `\s` or `\b` — so a Sigma pattern using them has to be rewritten in terms of explicit character classes. The converter does that rewriting and tells you where it happened, because a regex that silently changed meaning is worse than one that failed loudly.
There is also a small set of characters Lucene reserves and does not let you escape at all, `<` and `>` among them. A Sigma value containing one cannot be expressed as a Lucene term, and the report says so rather than emitting a query that parses into something else. Everything else — reserved characters, quoting, the `AND` / `OR` / `NOT` operators, which Lucene requires in uppercase unlike KQL — is escaped and spelled for you.
How it works
- Step 1
Paste the rule
Drop a Sigma rule into the left pane, or open a .yml file. The tool says what it thinks you pasted before anything is sent.
- Step 2
Pick your SIEM
Choose the target dialect. Every shipped target is free and none of them are behind a sign-up.
- Step 3
Read the report
The query comes back with the log-source profile that was used, every field it renamed, and anything the target could not express.
- Step 4
Verify, then deploy
Run it against your own telemetry in audit mode before it alerts on anything.
Questions
Paste the Sigma rule into the tool on this page and press Convert. It returns Lucene for Elastic Security, the log-source profile it matched, the field map it applied, and anything Elastic Security cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
Lucene anchors a regexp to the whole field value. A pattern that matches a substring in PCRE has to be wrapped in .* here. The converter does this, and the report says where it changed the pattern.
< and > cannot be escaped at all. A Sigma value containing one has no Lucene term form, so the conversion reports it rather than emitting a query that parses into something different from what the rule asked for.
It will run if your field names match the profile shown in the report. Whether it matches the right events depends on your own telemetry, so verify it before deploying. The coverage figure tells you how much of the rule made it into the query.
The other pair
The same tool, with a different target preselected.
- Sigma to SplunkSPLSearch Processing Language against a CIM-normalised index.
- Sigma to Microsoft SentinelKQLKusto over Sentinel's analytics tables.
- Sigma to Microsoft Defender XDRKQLKusto over the Defender advanced-hunting Device* schema.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityKQLKibana Query Language over ECS-mapped indices — the Kibana default.
- Sigma to CrowdStrike FalconCQLCrowdStrike Query Language for Falcon LogScale and Next-Gen SIEM.
Every rule in the detection catalog is written in Sigma, so any of them converts to Elastic Security here.