Sigma to Elastic Lucene
Paste a Sigma rule, get a Lucene query_string for Elastic Security — including the rules KQL cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
Worked examples on Elastic Security
Real published rules run through the same engine as the tool above — including the ones it cannot take whole.
Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utility id: 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a built-in utility being asked to base64-encode a file, which is a common way to stage data before moving it off a host. The flag is written out in both its dash and slash spellings, because the utility accepts either and a rule that names only one misses half the invocations. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - '-encode' - '/encode' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that legitimately encode files level: mediumElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.executable:*\\certutil.exe OR process.pe.original_file_name:CertUtil.exe) AND (process.command_line:*\-encode* OR process.command_line:*\/encode*))Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 2/2 conditions
PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Linewindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Line id: 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the download-and-run pattern where a remote payload is fetched and executed in one command. It exercises a value list under a single field, which every backend has to expand into its own OR form. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_fetch: CommandLine|contains: - '.DownloadString(' - '.DownloadFile(' - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: - '| IEX' - 'IEX (' - 'Invoke-Expression' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers and package managers that fetch and run their own payloads level: highElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.command_line:*.DownloadString\(* OR process.command_line:*.DownloadFile\(* OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-WebRequest\ * OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-RestMethod\ *) AND (process.command_line:*\|\ IEX* OR process.command_line:*IEX\ \(* OR process.command_line:*Invoke\-Expression*))Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 2/2 conditions
Registry Import With A Suspicious Pathwindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Registry Import With A Suspicious Path id: 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a registry import whose argument does not look like an ordinary file path. It exercises a regular expression alongside a `not` filter, so the report has both a regex to check against the target's engine and a negated branch to place. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: '.reg' CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' filter_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -e ' - ' -a ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter_flags falsepositives: - Scripted registry maintenance level: highElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND ((process.executable:*\\regedit.exe OR process.pe.original_file_name:REGEDIT.EXE) AND process.command_line:*.reg* AND process.command_line:/.*:[^ \\].*/ AND (NOT (process.command_line:*\ \-e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \/e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ –e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ —e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ ―e\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \-a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ \/a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ –a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ —a\ * OR process.command_line:*\ ―a\ *)))Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 3/3 conditions
File Copy Through The Print Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: File Copy Through The Print Utility id: 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the print utility being used to copy an executable rather than to print. It exercises `startswith` together with `contains|all`, where several substrings must all appear in one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: '\print.exe' CommandLine|startswith: 'print' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/D' - '.exe' filter_self: CommandLine|contains: 'print.exe' condition: selection and not filter_self falsepositives: - Printing a file whose name ends in .exe level: mediumElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND (process.executable:*\\print.exe AND process.command_line:print* AND process.command_line:*\/D* AND process.command_line:*.exe* AND (NOT process.command_line:*print.exe*))Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 2/2 conditions
Scheduled Task Created From A Temp Pathwindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Scheduled Task Created From A Temp Path id: 9d24a3ee-8a1b-4f26-b90f-4a71e2c85d17 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects schtasks.exe registering a task whose command line points into a temp directory, a common persistence shape. It exercises the bread-and-butter Sigma form — several selections ANDed by the condition — with no exotic modifiers, so it converts on every shipped target. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-11 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe' selection_create: CommandLine|contains: '/create' selection_path: CommandLine|contains: - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' - '\Windows\Temp\' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers registering update tasks from their extraction directory level: mediumElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND (process.executable:*\\schtasks.exe AND process.command_line:*\/create* AND (process.command_line:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR process.command_line:*\\Windows\\Temp\\*))Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 3/3 conditions
LSASS Memory Dump Via Comsvcswindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: LSASS Memory Dump Via Comsvcs id: 6a95c2d4-1e08-4f7b-9d52-8c41e7b30a96 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the comsvcs.dll MiniDump export being invoked through rundll32 to dump process memory, a common LSASS credential-theft technique. It exercises `endswith` against the image path together with `contains|all` on one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'comsvcs' - 'MiniDump' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrators legitimately capturing a process dump with comsvcs level: highElastic Security · Lucene
event.category:process AND event.type:start AND (process.executable:*\\rundll32.exe AND process.command_line:*comsvcs* AND process.command_line:*MiniDump*)Every condition converted cleanly to Elastic Security Lucene. 2/2 conditions
What to know about Elastic Security Lucene
Lucene is the second query language Kibana accepts, and on this site it is not the alternative to KQL so much as the completion of it. KQL has no regular-expression operator; Lucene does. If your Sigma rule uses `|re`, this is the page that can answer it, and Elastic's own documentation points the same way.
Lucene's regular expressions are not PCRE and the differences bite immediately. A Lucene regexp is implicitly anchored to the whole field value, so a pattern that would match a substring elsewhere matches nothing here unless it is wrapped in `.*`. The shorthand classes are absent — no `\d`, `\w`, `\s` or `\b` — so a Sigma pattern using them has to be rewritten in terms of explicit character classes. The converter does that rewriting and tells you where it happened, because a regex that silently changed meaning is worse than one that failed loudly.
There is also a small set of characters Lucene reserves and does not let you escape at all, `<` and `>` among them. A Sigma value containing one cannot be expressed as a Lucene term, and the report says so rather than emitting a query that parses into something else. Everything else — reserved characters, quoting, the `AND` / `OR` / `NOT` operators, which Lucene requires in uppercase unlike KQL — is escaped and spelled for you.
How it works
- Step 1
Paste the rule
Drop a Sigma rule into the left pane, or open a .yml file. The tool says what it thinks you pasted before anything is sent.
- Step 2
Pick your SIEM
Choose the target dialect. Every shipped target is free and none of them are behind a sign-up.
- Step 3
Read the report
The query comes back with the log-source profile that was used, every field it renamed, and anything the target could not express.
- Step 4
Verify, then deploy
Run it against your own telemetry in audit mode before it alerts on anything.
Questions
Paste the Sigma rule into the tool on this page and press Convert. It returns Lucene for Elastic Security, the log-source profile it matched, the field map it applied, and anything Elastic Security cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
Lucene anchors a regexp to the whole field value. A pattern that matches a substring in PCRE has to be wrapped in .* here. The converter does this, and the report says where it changed the pattern.
< and > cannot be escaped at all. A Sigma value containing one has no Lucene term form, so the conversion reports it rather than emitting a query that parses into something different from what the rule asked for.
It will run if your field names match the profile shown in the report. Whether it matches the right events depends on your own telemetry, so verify it before deploying. The coverage figure tells you how much of the rule made it into the query.
The other pair
The same tool, with a different target preselected.
- SplunkSPLSearch Processing Language against a CIM-normalised index.Open schemaConvert
- Splunk — Raw IndexSPLSearch Processing Language against raw indexed events without assuming CIM normalisation.Open schemaConvert
- Microsoft SentinelKQLKusto over Sentinel's analytics tables.Open schemaConvert
- Microsoft Sentinel ASIMASIM KQLKusto over ASIM's unifying parsers, not raw tables.Closed schemaConvert
- Microsoft Defender XDRKQLKusto over the Defender advanced-hunting Device* schema.Closed schemaConvert
- Elastic SecurityKQLKibana Query Language over ECS-mapped indices — the Kibana default.Open schemaConvert
- Elastic SecurityES|QLES|QL pipeline query over ECS indices — case-insensitive by construction, unlike KQL and Lucene.Closed schemaConvert
- CrowdStrike FalconCQLCrowdStrike Query Language for Falcon LogScale and Next-Gen SIEM.Open schemaConvert
- SentinelOnePowerQueryPowerQuery (S1QL 2.0) for Event Search and Singularity Data Lake, on the native EDR schema.Closed schemaConvert
- Palo Alto Cortex XDRXQLXQL over the Cortex agent's xdr_data dataset, scoped by event type.Closed schemaConvert
Carbon Black CloudPlatform SearchLucene query for Carbon Black Cloud Processes Search (Windows process creation).Closed schemaConvert
Carbon Black EDRProcess SearchToken search over the on-premises EDR product, where the process columns hold file names rather than paths.Open schemaConvert
Google Security OperationsUDM SearchA UDM Search predicate list for Investigation > SIEM Search, scoped by the normalised event type. Not a YARA-L detection rule, which is a different artifact.Closed schemaConvert- IBM QRadarAQLAriel Query Language for on-prem QRadar SIEM (Windows process creation).Closed schemaConvert
- Sumo Logic Cloud SIEMRules expressionThe expression half of a Cloud SIEM rule, over the normalised schema.Closed schemaConvert
- Rapid7Rapid7 InsightIDRLEQLLog Entry Query Language, with case-insensitive operators throughout.Closed schemaConvert
- GraylogSearchGraylog search syntax, with regexes where wildcards are blocked.Open schemaConvert
- OpenSearchLuceneLucene query_string over an ECS-mapped index. Covers Amazon OpenSearch Service.Open schemaConvert
- OpenSearch PPLPPLPiped Processing Language over an ECS-mapped index. Covers Amazon OpenSearch Service.Open schemaConvert
- GrafanaGrafana LokiLogQLLogQL over a stream selector you supply. Loki indexes labels, not line contents, so the selector is yours to fill in.Open schemaConvert
- SQLiteSQLA SELECT over your own table. No regex: SQLite defines none by default.Open schemaConvert
- DFIRZircoliteSQLiteSQL against Zircolite's flattened logs table, with regex support.Open schemaConvert
Every rule in the detection catalog is written in Sigma, so any of them converts to Elastic Security here.