Sigma to CrowdStrike
Paste a Sigma rule, get CrowdStrike Query Language for Falcon LogScale and Next-Gen SIEM. Free, no sign-up, with the Falcon field map shown.
Worked examples on CrowdStrike Falcon
Real published rules run through the same engine as the tool above — including the ones it cannot take whole.
Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utilitywindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utility id: 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a built-in utility being asked to base64-encode a file, which is a common way to stage data before moving it off a host. It exercises the `windash` modifier, where one flag has to be matched in both its dash and slash spellings. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that legitimately encode files level: medium license: DRL-1.1CrowdStrike Falcon · CQL
/* huntrule.com — sigma 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 */ (#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 OR #event_simpleName=SyntheticProcessRollup2) event_platform=Win ((wildcard(field=ImageFileName, pattern="*\\certutil.exe", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=OriginalFilename, pattern="CertUtil.exe", ignoreCase=true)) AND (wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*-encode*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*/encode*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*–encode*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*—encode*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*―encode*", ignoreCase=true)))Converted to CrowdStrike Falcon CQL with 1 note. 1/2 conditions
PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Linewindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Line id: 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the download-and-run pattern where a remote payload is fetched and executed in one command. It exercises a value list under a single field, which every backend has to expand into its own OR form. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_fetch: CommandLine|contains: - '.DownloadString(' - '.DownloadFile(' - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: - '| IEX' - 'IEX (' - 'Invoke-Expression' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers and package managers that fetch and run their own payloads level: high license: DRL-1.1CrowdStrike Falcon · CQL
/* huntrule.com — sigma 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 */ (#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 OR #event_simpleName=SyntheticProcessRollup2) event_platform=Win ((wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*.DownloadString(*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*.DownloadFile(*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*Invoke-WebRequest *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*Invoke-RestMethod *", ignoreCase=true)) AND (wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*| IEX*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*IEX (*", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*Invoke-Expression*", ignoreCase=true)))Every condition converted cleanly to CrowdStrike Falcon CQL. 2/2 conditions
Registry Import With A Suspicious Pathwindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: Registry Import With A Suspicious Path id: 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a registry import whose argument does not look like an ordinary file path. It exercises a regular expression alongside a `not` filter, so the report has both a regex to check against the target's engine and a negated branch to place. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: '.reg' CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' filter_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -e ' - ' -a ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter_flags falsepositives: - Scripted registry maintenance level: high license: DRL-1.1CrowdStrike Falcon · CQL
/* huntrule.com — sigma 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 */ (#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 OR #event_simpleName=SyntheticProcessRollup2) event_platform=Win ((wildcard(field=ImageFileName, pattern="*\\regedit.exe", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=OriginalFilename, pattern="REGEDIT.EXE", ignoreCase=true)) AND wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*.reg*", ignoreCase=true) AND CommandLine=/:[^ \\]/ AND (NOT (wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* -e *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* /e *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* –e *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* —e *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* ―e *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* -a *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* /a *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* –a *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* —a *", ignoreCase=true) OR wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="* ―a *", ignoreCase=true))))Converted to CrowdStrike Falcon CQL with 1 note. 2/3 conditions
File Copy Through The Print Utilitywindows / process_creationDegraded
Sigma
title: File Copy Through The Print Utility id: 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the print utility being used to copy an executable rather than to print. It exercises `startswith` together with `contains|all`, where several substrings must all appear in one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: '\print.exe' CommandLine|startswith: 'print' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/D' - '.exe' filter_self: CommandLine|contains: 'print.exe' condition: selection and not filter_self falsepositives: - Printing a file whose name ends in .exe level: medium license: DRL-1.1CrowdStrike Falcon · CQL
/* huntrule.com — sigma 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 */ (#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 OR #event_simpleName=SyntheticProcessRollup2) event_platform=Win (wildcard(field=ImageFileName, pattern="*\\print.exe", ignoreCase=true) AND wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="print*", ignoreCase=true) AND wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*/D*", ignoreCase=true) AND wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*.exe*", ignoreCase=true) AND (!wildcard(field=CommandLine, pattern="*print.exe*", ignoreCase=true)))Converted to CrowdStrike Falcon CQL with 1 note. 1/2 conditions
What to know about CrowdStrike Falcon CQL
CrowdStrike has four query surfaces and only one of them is worth writing in 2026. Falcon Event Search is the SPL-derived console search CrowdStrike itself files under Legacy-Event-Search and publishes a migration map away from; Falcon Query Language is an API filter syntax, not a hunting language. What Next-Gen SIEM, LogScale and Advanced Event Search all take is CQL, and that is the one thing this page emits. CrowdStrike does not ingest Sigma anywhere — the correlation-rule builder takes CQL or a CrowdStrike template, and the 2026 Query Translation Agent converts Splunk SPL, not Sigma — so translation is the only route in.
The query opens with a #event_simpleName filter, and the hash is load-bearing. Tag fields partition a LogScale repository into datasources, so a tag filter prunes whole partitions before a single event is read. Put it anywhere but first and the same query scans everything. event_platform is an ordinary field and carries no hash. Both spellings come from CrowdStrike's own published queries.
Two things trip up hand-written translations. CQL's OR binds tighter than its AND, which is the reverse of SQL, SPL and KQL, so an unparenthesised mix of the two means something different here than everywhere else; every clause this converter emits is parenthesised for that reason. And Falcon's telemetry is not Sysmon's: there are no drive letters, only \Device\HarddiskVolume paths; the parent process is recorded as a bare filename with no directory; IntegrityLevel is a number rather than a word; and ParentCommandLine does not exist at all. The report names each of those where a rule hits one, rather than emitting a query that runs and quietly matches nothing.
How it works
- Step 1
Paste the rule
Drop a Sigma rule into the left pane, or open a .yml file. The tool says what it thinks you pasted before anything is sent.
- Step 2
Pick your SIEM
Choose the target dialect. Every shipped target is free and none of them are behind a sign-up.
- Step 3
Read the report
The query comes back with the log-source profile that was used, every field it renamed, and anything the target could not express.
- Step 4
Verify, then deploy
Run it against your own telemetry in audit mode before it alerts on anything.
Questions
Paste the Sigma rule into the tool on this page and press Convert. It returns CQL for CrowdStrike Falcon, the log-source profile it matched, the field map it applied, and anything CrowdStrike Falcon cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
No. The correlation-rule builder takes a CQL query or a CrowdStrike-supplied template, and CrowdStrike's own query translation agent converts legacy SIEM queries such as Splunk SPL rather than Sigma. Converting the rule to CQL first is the only route in.
CQL, the CrowdStrike Query Language used by Falcon LogScale, Next-Gen SIEM correlation rules and Advanced Event Search. FQL is the REST API filter syntax and cannot express a detection, so it is not a translation target. The legacy SPL-style Event Search surface is not emitted either.
Because it is a tag field. LogScale partitions a repository by tag value, so filtering on one prunes whole partitions before any event is scanned, and CrowdStrike's documentation asks for tag filters to be placed first. event_platform is an ordinary field and carries no hash.
It will run if your field names match the profile shown in the report. Whether it matches the right events depends on your own telemetry, so verify it before deploying. The coverage figure tells you how much of the rule made it into the query.
The other pair
The same tool, with a different target preselected.
- Sigma to SplunkSPLSearch Processing Language against a CIM-normalised index.
- Sigma to Microsoft SentinelKQLKusto over Sentinel's analytics tables.
- Sigma to Microsoft Defender XDRKQLKusto over the Defender advanced-hunting Device* schema.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityKQLKibana Query Language over ECS-mapped indices — the Kibana default.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityLuceneLucene query_string — required when the rule uses a regular expression.
Every rule in the detection catalog is written in Sigma, so any of them converts to CrowdStrike Falcon here.