Sigma to Splunk
Paste a Sigma rule, get SPL you can run. Free, no sign-up, and it shows the field map it used.
Worked examples on Splunk
Real published rules run through the same engine as the tool above — including the ones it cannot take whole.
Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Base64 Encoding Via Built-In Windows Utility id: 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a built-in utility being asked to base64-encode a file, which is a common way to stage data before moving it off a host. It exercises the `windash` modifier, where one flag has to be matched in both its dash and slash spellings. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that legitimately encode files level: medium license: DRL-1.1Splunk · SPL
` huntrule.com — sigma 7c1e0a34-2b5f-4d18-9a63-0c8b1f4e5a71 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 ` `sigma_windows_process_creation` ((process_path="*\\certutil.exe" OR original_file_name="CertUtil.exe") AND (process="*-encode*" OR process="*/encode*" OR process="*–encode*" OR process="*—encode*" OR process="*―encode*"))Every condition converted cleanly to Splunk SPL. 2/2 conditions
PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Linewindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: PowerShell Download Cradle On The Command Line id: 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the download-and-run pattern where a remote payload is fetched and executed in one command. It exercises a value list under a single field, which every backend has to expand into its own OR form. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_fetch: CommandLine|contains: - '.DownloadString(' - '.DownloadFile(' - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: - '| IEX' - 'IEX (' - 'Invoke-Expression' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Installers and package managers that fetch and run their own payloads level: high license: DRL-1.1Splunk · SPL
` huntrule.com — sigma 1f9d4c02-6a77-4e5b-8c31-2d0af7b96e48 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 ` `sigma_windows_process_creation` ((process="*.DownloadString(*" OR process="*.DownloadFile(*" OR process="*Invoke-WebRequest *" OR process="*Invoke-RestMethod *") AND (process="*\| IEX*" OR process="*IEX (*" OR process="*Invoke-Expression*"))Every condition converted cleanly to Splunk SPL. 2/2 conditions
Registry Import With A Suspicious Pathwindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: Registry Import With A Suspicious Path id: 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects a registry import whose argument does not look like an ordinary file path. It exercises a regular expression alongside a `not` filter, so the report has both a regex to check against the target's engine and a negated branch to place. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe' - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: '.reg' CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]' filter_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -e ' - ' -a ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter_flags falsepositives: - Scripted registry maintenance level: high license: DRL-1.1Splunk · SPL
` huntrule.com — sigma 5b3a8e91-4c26-4f70-b1d8-6e97c30a2f5d — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 ` `sigma_windows_process_creation` ((process_path="*\\regedit.exe" OR original_file_name="REGEDIT.EXE") AND process="*.reg*" AND (NOT (process="* -e *" OR process="* /e *" OR process="* –e *" OR process="* —e *" OR process="* ―e *" OR process="* -a *" OR process="* /a *" OR process="* –a *" OR process="* —a *" OR process="* ―a *"))) | regex process=":[^ \x5c]"Every condition converted cleanly to Splunk SPL. 3/3 conditions
File Copy Through The Print Utilitywindows / process_creationClean
Sigma
title: File Copy Through The Print Utility id: 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 status: experimental description: | A sample rule for the huntrule.com converter. Detects the print utility being used to copy an executable rather than to print. It exercises `startswith` together with `contains|all`, where several substrings must all appear in one field. author: HuntRule Team date: 2026-08-01 tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: '\print.exe' CommandLine|startswith: 'print' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/D' - '.exe' filter_self: CommandLine|contains: 'print.exe' condition: selection and not filter_self falsepositives: - Printing a file whose name ends in .exe level: medium license: DRL-1.1Splunk · SPL
` huntrule.com — sigma 3e6c17b8-9f40-4a2d-85e1-7b4d0c9a6f23 — HuntRule Team — DRL-1.1 ` `sigma_windows_process_creation` (process_path="*\\print.exe" AND process="print*" AND process="*/D*" AND process="*.exe*" AND (NOT process="*print.exe*"))Every condition converted cleanly to Splunk SPL. 2/2 conditions
What to know about Splunk SPL
SPL is forgiving in the place that matters most for a converted rule: fields are resolved at search time, so a field name the profile could not map is passed through rather than rejected. That means a Splunk conversion almost always produces something that runs — and it is exactly why the report below matters. A query that runs is not the same as a query that matches, and a Sigma field carried through unchanged only fires if your index happens to use that name.
Wildcards are the other place Sigma and SPL disagree quietly. Sigma's `*` is a substring wildcard anywhere in a value; SPL's is too, but only inside quoted terms and only after the search-time field extraction has run. The converter emits quoted wildcards and escapes backslashes for Windows paths, which is the single most common way a hand-written Splunk translation of a Sigma rule silently matches nothing.
The default profile assumes a CIM-normalised index — `process_path`, `process`, `parent_process_path` — because that is what most Splunk estates running Sysmon actually have. If yours is raw, change the profile in the report and convert again; the runners-up are listed with what each matched on.
How it works
- Step 1
Paste the rule
Drop a Sigma rule into the left pane, or open a .yml file. The tool says what it thinks you pasted before anything is sent.
- Step 2
Pick your SIEM
Choose the target dialect. Every shipped target is free and none of them are behind a sign-up.
- Step 3
Read the report
The query comes back with the log-source profile that was used, every field it renamed, and anything the target could not express.
- Step 4
Verify, then deploy
Run it against your own telemetry in audit mode before it alerts on anything.
Questions
Paste the Sigma rule into the tool on this page and press Convert. It returns SPL for Splunk, the log-source profile it matched, the field map it applied, and anything Splunk cannot express. Free, no sign-up.
By default, yes — CIM Endpoint field names are what most Splunk estates running Sysmon have. The report names the profile it used and lists the alternatives, and you can convert again against any of them.
Usually a field name. SPL resolves fields at search time, so an unmapped Sigma field is passed through and the clause only matches where that exact name exists. The report flags every passed-through field for this reason.
It will run if your field names match the profile shown in the report. Whether it matches the right events depends on your own telemetry, so verify it before deploying. The coverage figure tells you how much of the rule made it into the query.
The other pair
The same tool, with a different target preselected.
- Sigma to Microsoft SentinelKQLKusto over Sentinel's analytics tables.
- Sigma to Microsoft Defender XDRKQLKusto over the Defender advanced-hunting Device* schema.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityKQLKibana Query Language over ECS-mapped indices — the Kibana default.
- Sigma to Elastic SecurityLuceneLucene query_string — required when the rule uses a regular expression.
- Sigma to CrowdStrike FalconCQLCrowdStrike Query Language for Falcon LogScale and Next-Gen SIEM.
Every rule in the detection catalog is written in Sigma, so any of them converts to Splunk here.